The United Kingdom’s quantitative easing policy: design, operation and impact by Joyce, Michael et al.
200 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q3
Introduction
After the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008,
confidence in the world economy collapsed, international
financial markets became dysfunctional and credit conditions
tightened markedly.  
As the crisis intensified, central banks internationally took
measures to loosen monetary policy and support demand.  In
the United Kingdom, the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy
Committee (MPC) cut interest rates sharply, with cuts of 
3 percentage points in Bank Rate during 2008 Q4 and a
further 1½ percentage points in early 2009.  In early March
2009, Bank Rate was reduced to ½%, effectively its lower
bound.  But, despite this substantial loosening in policy, the
MPC judged that without additional measures nominal
spending would be too weak to meet the 2% CPI inflation
target in the medium term.  The MPC therefore also
announced that it would begin a programme of large-scale
purchases of public and private assets using central bank
money.(2) The aim of the policy was to inject money into the
economy in order to boost nominal spending and thus help
achieve the 2% inflation target.
The policy of expanding the central bank’s balance sheet
through asset purchases, financed by central bank money is
widely referred to as quantitative easing (QE).(3) The Bank of
England’s asset purchases were overwhelmingly focused on
purchasing a large amount of UK government bonds (gilts).
Between March 2009 and January 2010, the Bank purchased
£200 billion of assets, mostly medium and long-dated gilts.
These asset purchases represented nearly 30% of the amount
of outstanding gilts held by the private sector at the time and
around 14% of annual nominal GDP.  Combined with earlier
liquidity support measures to the banking sector,(4) these
purchases increased the size of the Bank’s balance sheet
relative to GDP threefold compared with the pre-crisis period.  
The Government also authorised the Bank to pursue a number
of activities targeted to improve the functioning of specific
financial markets (see Fisher (2010a)).  This included purchases
of high-quality commercial paper and corporate bonds.  The
scale of these operations was much less than for the gilt
purchases, consistent with the Bank acting as a backstop
purchaser/seller with the intention of improving market
functioning.
In response to the intensification of the financial crisis in Autumn 2008, the Bank of England, in
common with other central banks, loosened monetary policy using both conventional and
unconventional policy measures.  In the United Kingdom, the principal element of these
unconventional measures was the policy of asset purchases financed by central bank money, 
so-called quantitative easing (QE).  Over the period March 2009 to January 2010, £200 billion of
assets were purchased, overwhelmingly made up of government securities, representing around
14% of annual GDP.  This article reviews the motivation for these central bank asset purchases and
describes how they were implemented.  It goes on to review a range of evidence for the impact of
the asset purchases made to date, both on financial markets and more widely on the economy.
While there is considerable uncertainty about the magnitudes, the evidence suggests that QE asset
purchases have had economically significant effects.  
The United Kingdom’s quantitative
easing policy:  design, operation and
impact
By Michael Joyce, Matthew Tong and Robert Woods of the Bank’s Macro Financial Analysis Division.
(1)
(1) The authors would like to thank Nick McLaren, Haroon Mumtaz and Tom Smith for
their help in producing this article.
(2) Other central banks internationally also lowered monetary policy rates to levels close
to the lower bound and introduced unconventional measures.  For more information
see Borio and Disyatat (2009).
(3) For example, see Bernanke and Reinhart (2004).
(4) For more detail on the development of the Bank of England’s liquidity insurance
facilities, see Cross, Fisher and Weeken (2010).Research and analysis The United Kingdom’s quantitative easing policy 201
This article provides an overview of the United Kingdom’s QE
policy.  The next section explains the possible channels
through which asset purchases may affect the economy.  The
following section briefly explains the design of the QE
programme and how the purchases were implemented.  The
article then reviews a range of evidence on the financial and
wider macroeconomic effects.  The final section concludes.
Transmission channels for asset purchases 
How do asset purchases affect spending and inflation?
The aim of undertaking asset purchases was the same as a 
cut in Bank Rate, to stimulate nominal spending and thereby
domestically generated inflation, so as to meet the MPC’s 
2% inflation target in the medium term.(1) As discussed in a
previous Quarterly Bulletin article by Benford et al (2009),
there are a number of potential channels through which asset
purchases might affect spending and inflation.(2) Purchases of
financial assets financed by central bank money should initially
increase broad money holdings, push up asset prices and
stimulate expenditure by lowering borrowing costs and
increasing wealth.  Asset purchases may also have a
stimulatory impact through their broader effects on
expectations and by influencing bank lending, though this
channel would not be expected to be material during times of
financial crisis.  These channels are considered in more detail
below with Figure 1 providing a simple pictorial
representation.
Channels working through asset prices
Policy signalling effects: This channel includes anything
economic agents learn about the likely path of future
monetary policy from asset purchases.  For example, asset
purchases may have led market participants to expect policy
rates to remain low for longer than otherwise by signalling the
MPC’s determination to meet the inflation target.  At the time
the MPC decided to initiate asset purchases, policymakers
were concerned about the risks of inflation falling significantly
below target in the medium term.  This could have led to lower
inflation expectations, which would have pushed up on real
interest rates, even with nominal rates kept at very low levels,
and reduced spending in the economy.  By helping to ensure
that inflation expectations remain well anchored to the target,
asset purchases could help to support spending.  More
generally, policy announcements on asset purchases might
contain ‘news’ about the underlying state of the economy, for
example if agents relied on central bank analysis to inform
their views on the economy.
Portfolio balance effects: Central bank asset purchases,
through this channel, push up the prices of the assets bought
and also the prices of other assets.  When the central bank
purchases assets, the money holdings of the sellers are
increased.  Unless money is a perfect substitute for the assets
sold, the sellers may attempt to rebalance their portfolios by
buying other assets that are better substitutes.(3) This shifts
the excess money balances to the sellers of those assets who
may, in turn, attempt to rebalance their portfolios by buying
further assets — and so on.  This process will raise the prices of
assets until the point where investors, in aggregate, are willing
to hold the overall supplies of assets and money.  Higher asset
prices mean lower yields, and lower borrowing costs for firms
and households, which acts to stimulate spending.  In addition,
higher asset prices stimulate spending by increasing the net
wealth of asset holders.  
While policy signalling effects affect expected policy rates,
portfolio balance effects work by reducing the spreads of
(1) For discussion of the other factors affecting inflation more recently, see Section 4 of
the August 2011 Inflation Report. 
(2) The channels through which QE may affect the economy are the subject of a lot of
debate.  In conventional New Keynesian models, asset purchases can only work to the
extent that they change agents’ expectations of the future path of policy rates (see,
for example, Eggertsson and Woodford (2003)).  Asset purchases on their own do not
change behaviour because the assumptions made imply the distinction between
public and private asset holdings is unimportant.  But in other models with credit
constraints, distortionary taxes or incomplete markets, and with imperfect
substitutability between different assets, asset purchases may also affect asset prices
by changing the relative supplies of different assets (see, for example, Andrés, 
López-Salido and Nelson (2004) and Harrison (2011)).
(3) The concept of imperfect substitutability goes back to Tobin (1958).  Dale (2010) and
Joyce et al (2011) discuss some of the related theoretical background.  Various factors
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longer-term interest rates over expected policy rates (term
premia) and the required return on risky assets relative to 
risk-free assets (risk premia) more generally.(1)
Liquidity premia effects: When financial markets are
dysfunctional, central bank asset purchases can improve
market functioning by increasing liquidity through actively
encouraging trading.  Asset prices may therefore increase
through lower premia for illiquidity.  The effects of this channel
may, however, only persist while the monetary authority is
conducting asset purchases.
Other channels
Confidence effects: Asset purchases may have broader
confidence effects beyond any effects generated through the
effect of higher asset prices.  For example, to the extent that
the policy leads to an improved economic outlook, it might
directly boost consumer confidence and thus people’s
willingness to spend.  Some of this more general improvement
in confidence may also be reflected back in higher asset prices,
especially by reducing risk premia. 
Bank lending effects: When assets are purchased from 
non-banks (either directly or indirectly via intermediate
transactions), the banking sector gains both new reserves at
the Bank of England and a corresponding increase in customer
deposits.  A higher level of liquid assets could then encourage
banks to extend more new loans than they otherwise would
have done.  But, given the strains in the financial system at the
time and the resultant pressures on banks to reduce the size of
their balance sheets, the MPC expected little impact through
this channel.(2)
How does the economy adjust to asset purchases?
The overall effect of asset purchases on the macroeconomy
can be broken down into two stages:  an initial ‘impact’ phase
and an ‘adjustment’ phase, during which the stimulus from
asset purchases works through the economy, as illustrated in
Chart 1.  As discussed above, in the impact phase, asset
purchases change the composition of the portfolios held by
the private sector, increasing holdings of broad money and
decreasing those of medium and long-term gilts.  But because
gilts and money are imperfect substitutes, this creates an
initial imbalance.  As asset portfolios are rebalanced, asset
prices are bid up until equilibrium in money and asset markets
is restored.  This is reinforced by the signalling channel and the
other effects of asset purchases already discussed, which may
also act to raise asset prices.  Through lower borrowing costs
and higher wealth, asset prices then raise demand, which acts
to push up the consumer price level. 
In the adjustment phase, rising consumer and asset prices raise
the demand for money balances and the supply of long-term
assets.  So the initial imbalance in money and asset markets
shrinks, and real asset prices begin to fall back.  The boost to
demand therefore diminishes and the price level continues to
increase but by smaller amounts.  The whole process continues
until the price level has risen sufficiently to restore real money
balances, real asset prices and real output to their equilibrium
levels.  Thus, from a position of deficient demand, asset
purchases should accelerate the return of the economy to
equilibrium.  
Design and operations   
How did the transmission channels affect the design of
the programme?(3)
The Bank of England’s asset purchase programme has attached
particular importance to the portfolio balance channel.  That is
why purchases have been targeted towards long-term assets
held by non-bank financial institutions, like insurers and
pension funds, who may be encouraged to use the funds to
invest in other, riskier assets like corporate bonds and
equities.(4)
Before asset purchases began, the main holders of gilts were
UK non-bank financial institutions and overseas investors.
Gilts only represented a modest part of UK non-bank financial
institutions’ overall portfolios, suggesting they might be
prepared to reinvest some of the money from gilt sales in
other assets.  Overseas investors might be more inclined to
choose to invest in foreign assets.  However, to do so they
would need to change their sterling for foreign currency,
putting downward pressure on the exchange rate.  And, since
all central bank money has to be held by someone, those who
received the sterling might then choose to invest in other
sterling assets.
(1) The evidence considered in this article suggests that the larger effect was through
lower premia.  This is also consistent with the US evidence, eg Gagnon et al (2010).
(2) See minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee meeting for the 4 and 5 March 2009,
published on 18 March 2009.
(3) For more information on the design of the Bank’s asset purchase programme see
Fisher (2010a,b).
(4) Fisher (2010b) notes that the Japanese QE programme over 2001–06 purchased
government bonds which had been mostly held by banks, who used the proceeds to
deleverage without obviously increasing the demand for other assets.  
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At the end of 2008, UK banks held only about 4% of the total
stock of gilts, and these tended to be shorter-maturity ones.
As Chart 2 shows, the banking sector actually increased its
holdings of gilts during the period that the Bank was
conducting asset purchases, suggesting that the main impact
was to reduce the gilt holdings of the non-bank private sector
relative to what would otherwise have happened. 
The MPC has not used the asset purchase programme
explicitly to signal future intentions about the likely path of
policy rates.  It emphasised its ongoing commitment to meet
the inflation target using its normal communication channels,
for example, the minutes of MPC meetings and the Inflation
Report.(1) That said, asset purchases gave a clear signal that
the Bank would continue to be able to loosen monetary policy
and stimulate demand even when Bank Rate is effectively at
its lower bound, which could have had strong expectations
effects.  This signal could have substantially changed the
distribution of future macroeconomic outcomes, reducing the
chance of further large falls in asset prices and hence reducing
risk premia more generally, as well as having the sort of
broader confidence effects discussed above.  
For the Bank’s purchases of gilts, the liquidity premia channel
was not expected to be very important.  The gilt market
continued to function effectively throughout the crisis,
although even here the strains in financial markets could be
discerned at times.  The liquidity premia channel was more
important in the design of the Bank’s (relatively small-scale)
purchases of private sector assets.  This programme sought to
improve the availability of capital market finance to companies
more directly, by improving the liquidity in certain markets.(2)
In this case, purchases provided confidence to investors and
issuers that they could find buyers for these assets if they
needed to sell quickly without incurring an excessive price
discount.
Operational considerations
The Bank of England Asset Purchase Facility (APF) was
announced on 19 January 2009, with the details set out in an
exchange of letters between the Governor of the Bank of
England and the Chancellor of the Exchequer later in the
month.  Initially the APF bought private sector assets funded
by the issuance of Treasury bills and the cash management
operations of the Debt Management Office (DMO).  The APF
became a vehicle for monetary policy when, in March 2009,
the MPC decided to purchase assets financed by the creation
of central bank money.
While the MPC reviewed the appropriate scale of the
programme each month, due to the large size of the
programme, it tended to conduct policy in terms of a target
level of purchases over periods longer than a month.  This
allowed purchases to be conducted at a pace that would not
generate additional market disorder.  At the March 2009
meeting, the MPC decided to purchase £75 billion of assets
over a three-month period.  A monthly rate of purchases of
£25 billion was maintained until the August MPC meeting
when it fell to just over £16 billion a month, falling again to
just over £8 billion a month over the three months 
following the November MPC meeting.  In total £200 billion 
of assets were purchased, mostly comprising gilts.  Charts 3
and 4 show the amounts purchased of gilts, commercial 
paper and corporate bonds.  Further details of the key
announcements related to asset purchases are given in 
Table A.
The Bank of England executed the MPC’s decisions with a
concern to avoid unnecessary disruption to the gilt market.  As
the Bank accumulated a large percentage of some gilts in
issue, there was a risk that segments of the gilt market might
become dislocated.  To alleviate this, in August 2009 the Bank
announced it would start to lend out a proportion of the gilts it
had bought, through the DMO, in exchange for other gilts that
had readier availability.(3) At the same time, the maturity of
conventional gilts the Bank would purchase was extended
from 5–25 years to all conventional gilts with maturities of
three years or more.  This simply reflected the fact that by this
stage the Bank was holding a large proportion of some of the
gilts in issue in the 5–25 year maturity range.  Chart 4
illustrates the composition of APF gilt purchases by maturity.
Given the shortest residual maturity of gilts purchased was 
three years, the earliest redemption is not until 2013.  Interest
(1) See Bean (2011).  
(2) Tucker (2009) and Fisher (2010a) describe the Bank’s role in these private sector asset
markets as acting as a ‘market maker of last resort’ and set out some guiding
principles for such operations.
(3) They were not lent out against cash as that would have undone some of the intended
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Chart 2 Change in gilt holdings by sector since 2008 Q1(a)
(a) Purchases by the non-bank private sector exclude repos.
(b) Gilts acquired through asset purchases are held by the Asset Purchase Facility, a subsidiary of
the Bank of England.receipts from gilts purchased accumulate in the APF, and so
will repayments of principal when they fall due.  They are not
automatically reinvested unless the MPC decides to do so.  
Evidence on the impact
This section describes some of the evidence on the impact of
the Bank’s QE asset purchases on the economy, shedding some
light on the importance of the different transmission channels
discussed above.  It is difficult to measure directly the effects
of monetary policy measures such as QE and so estimates of
those effects are highly uncertain.
Asset prices and quantities
Gilt yields
The bulk of the Bank of England’s asset purchases were of
conventional gilts, so it might be expected that the largest
initial impact would have been on the gilt market.  A natural
starting point for assessing the effect of the policy is to look at
the immediate reaction of gilt yields to announcements about
QE, as ordinarily market prices would be expected to respond
directly to news about asset purchases, rather than waiting for
the purchases themselves to occur.
Chart 5 (taken from Joyce et al (2011)) shows the average
reaction of medium to long-term gilt yields to the six pieces of
QE news highlighted in Table A.(1)
By far the largest gilt market reaction was in March 2009 
(75 basis points) when the QE programme was first
announced, but there were also large reactions after the
February 2009 Inflation Report and associated press
conference, which suggested that a policy of asset purchases
was likely, and after the August announcement of a further
extension of the programme.  All these reactions were
statistically significant in relation to the normal volatility over
the pre-crisis period.  Summing over the reactions in gilt yields
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Chart 4 Cumulative gilt purchases by maturity
Table A APF and QE-related announcements
Date Event
2009
19 January The Chancellor of the Exchequer announces that the Bank of England will 
set up an asset purchase programme.
30 January Asset Purchase Facility Fund established.  Exchange of letters between 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Governor on 29 January 2009.
5 February Bank Rate reduced from 1.5% to 1%.
11 February FebruaryInflation Report and the associated press conference give strong 
indication that QE asset purchases are likely.
13 February First purchases of commercial paper begin.
5 March Bank Rate reduced from 1% to 0.5%.  The MPC announces it will 
purchase £75 billion of assets over three months funded by central bank 
money.  Conventional bonds likely to constitute the majority of 
purchases, restricted to bonds with residual maturity between 5 and 
25 years.
11 March First purchases of gilts begin.
25 March First purchases of corporate bonds begin.
7 May The MPC announces that the amount of QE asset purchases will be 
extended by a further £50 billion to £125 billion.
3 August Secured commercial paper facility launched.
6 August The MPC announces that QE asset purchases will be extended to 
£175 billion and that the buying range will be extended to gilts with a 
residual maturity greater than three years.  The Bank announces a gilt 
lending programme, which allows counterparties to borrow gilts from the
APF’s portfolio via the DMO in return for a fee and alternative gilts as 
collateral.
5 November The MPC announces that QE asset purchases will be extended to 
£200 billion.
22 December The Bank announces that it will act as a seller, as well as a buyer, of 
corporate bonds in the secondary market.
2010
8 January First sales of corporate bonds.
4 February The MPC announces that QE asset purchases will be maintained at 
£200 billion.  The Chancellor authorises the Bank to continue to transact 
in private sector assets, with further purchases financed by issuance of 
Treasury bills.  The MPC’s press statement says that the Committee will 
continue to monitor the appropriate scale of the asset purchase 
programme and that further purchases will be made should the outlook 
warrant them.
Shading denotes announcements used in the event study analysis by Joyce et al (2011)
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and corporate bonds
(1) The reaction is measured by the change in yields over a two-day window from close of
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to each of the QE news events gives an overall average fall of
just under 100 basis points.  
Most of the fall in gilt yields was not reflected in corresponding
interest rates implied by overnight index swap (OIS) contracts,
which fell by less than 10 basis points in total over the six
events.  To the extent that OIS rates can be used as a
benchmark for default risk-free rates,(1) this suggests that the
fall in gilt yields cannot primarily be attributed to signalling
effects about future policy rates, or more broadly to
macroeconomic news.  Instead, it is consistent with the main
effect coming through portfolio rebalancing.(2)
As an alternative measure of the impact of QE purchases on
gilt yields, Joyce et al (2011) make use of a Reuters survey of
economists’ expectations regarding the total size of QE
purchases to calculate the amount of asset purchase news in
each announcement.  Chart 6 shows there was a strong
negative relationship between two-day changes in 
zero-coupon gilt yields and the amount of QE news in each
announcement.  A simple regression of the two suggests a fall
in gilt yields of 0.62 basis points for each additional £1 billion
of unanticipated QE purchases announced.  Separate OLS
regressions of QE news on OIS rates and gilt-OIS spreads were
also estimated.  Scaling up the estimates suggests an overall
impact from £200 billion of unanticipated purchases of 
125 basis points on yields, split between about 45 basis points
on OIS rates (policy signalling channel) and 80 basis points on
gilt-OIS spreads (portfolio balance channel).
As discussed above, the portfolio balance effect of QE on gilt
yields would be expected to show up in lower term premia
(the spread of long-term interest rates over expected policy
rates).  Using a term structure model of the nominal and real
gilt yield curves (based on Joyce, Lildholdt and Sorensen
(2010)), Chart 7 shows the decomposition of gilt yields 
into expected future short rates and term premia over a 
two-month window from the start of February 2009 to the
end of March 2009, the period when most of the news about
the United Kingdom’s asset purchases occurred.  According to
the model decomposition over this period, term premia were
compressed by around 25 basis points at medium and longer
maturities, but expected real short-term rates also declined
and there was a modest increase in expected inflation.
However, the fact that the fall in yields at long maturities 
is not fully explained could be consistent with an additional
supply effect on term premia (of a further 25 to 35 basis
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Chart 6 Size of surprise and average gilt yield changes



















Chart 5 Announcement impact on gilt yields, OIS rates
and gilt-OIS spreads(a)
Sources:  Joyce et al (2011), Bloomberg and Bank calculations.
(a) Average change in 5–25 year spot rates unless otherwise specified.
(1) Since OIS contracts settle on overnight rates and are collateralised they should
contain minimal credit risk.  For more information, see Joyce and Meldrum (2008). 
(2) Portfolio rebalancing might be expected to affect gilt yields but not OIS rates, as the
latter are inferred from derivatives contracts which are less likely to be affected by
supply constraints.  The Bank’s market contacts suggest that institutional investors
would be unlikely to use OIS contracts as a substitute for their gilt holdings, implying
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Chart 7 Affine term structure model gilt yield
decomposition for February-March 2009 
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Other asset prices
The portfolio balance effect suggests that, to the extent that
investors regarded other assets — such as corporate bonds and
equities, and foreign assets — as closer substitutes for gilts
than money, they would have wanted to reduce their money
holdings associated with QE purchases and buy those other
assets.  This would be expected to have put upward pressure
on the prices of those assets, and perhaps downward pressure
on the sterling exchange rate.  Quite apart from this effect,
announcements about QE might have contained information
about the economy that had implications for perceptions of
future corporate earnings and the uncertainty around them;
and changes in the prices of gilts may have affected the rate 
at which investors discount future cash flows.  All of these
effects might be expected to have taken time to feed through,
as it took time for investors and asset managers to rebalance
their portfolios and asset prices are unlikely to have
anticipated this process fully (particularly given the novelty of
the QE policy).
Indeed, as summarised in Table B, the announcement
reactions of some other asset prices were less unequivocal
than those for gilt prices.  Corporate bond yields, however, did
show a clear reaction.  Summing over the immediate reaction
to the six QE news announcements, sterling investment-grade
corporate bond yields fell by 70 basis points, with spreads
relative to gilt yields remaining broadly flat.  Sterling 
non-investment grade corporate bond yields fell by 150 basis
points, with spreads narrowing by 75 basis points.(1) Over the
same announcement windows, international investment-grade
bond yields fell by less than sterling-denominated bonds,
suggesting that there was a UK-specific effect.  
Equity prices did not react in a uniform way in response to 
QE news.  The FTSE All-Share index fell slightly following the
publication of the February Inflation Report and more 
sharply following the March MPC announcement.  Over the
same period, however, international equity prices fell by 
even more, suggesting that there might have been a small
positive UK-specific effect.  Following the next three 
QE announcements, UK equity prices increased somewhat, but
fell after the February 2010 announcement, though this is
unlikely to have been a QE effect, as the February decision was
widely expected.
Sterling’s reaction was more in line with what might have been
expected.  Uncovered interest parity would predict a
depreciation in response to lower domestic interest rates.
Summing over the immediate reactions to the six QE news
announcements, the sterling ERI did indeed depreciate by
around 4%.  
Of course, as already discussed, these initial market reactions
are unlikely to have reflected the full effects of QE.  Table B
and Chart 8 show that, over a longer period from March 2009
to May 2010, there were sustained rises in asset prices.  But it
is not possible to know how much of those rises were directly
attributable to QE in the United Kingdom, as this was part of a
more general pickup in international asset prices, reflecting the
large fiscal and monetary stimulus across the advanced
economies. 
Econometric model estimates based on applying a portfolio
balance approach to historical (pre-crisis) data suggest that
the initial reaction of gilt and corporate debt markets shown 
in Table B was broadly in line with what might have been
expected.  The equity price response might, however, have
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Chart 8 Changes in major UK asset prices
Sources:  Bloomberg, Merrill Lynch and Bank calculations.
Table B Summary of asset price movements
Asset Change  around  Change Comments
announcements 4 March 2009–
31 May 2010
Gilts -100 basis points (bp) +30bp (of which Portfolio balance 
(of which -90bp in  +15bp in gilt-OIS  channel dominates the
gilt-OIS spreads) spreads) signalling effect.
Gilts (reaction to  -125bp +30bp (of which Portfolio balance 
QE ‘news’) (of which -80bp in  +15bp in gilt-OIS channel dominates 
gilt-OIS spreads) spreads) when controlling for 
QE news using Reuters 
survey.
Corporate yields  -70bp -400bp Smaller fall than gilts 
(investment grade) perhaps due to shorter 
average duration.  




Corporate yields  -150bp -2,000bp Larger announcement 
(high yield) effects, possibly 
reflecting the removal 
of tail risk.
FTSE All-Share -3% +50% No announcement 
effects, but prices up 
during the period.
Sterling ERI -4% +1% Small announcement 
effect.
Source:  Joyce et al (2011).
(1) These numbers imply corresponding gilt yields fell by around 75 basis points.  This is
different from the 100 basis point average fall in gilt yields discussed above, as sterling
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though this is subject to great uncertainty (see Joyce et al
(2011)).(1)
Corporate bond and equity issuance
Firms might have been expected to respond to higher equity
and corporate bond prices by increasing their use of capital
markets to raise funds and there is some evidence of this.  Net
equity issuance by UK private non-financial corporations was
particularly strong in 2009, reversing the negative net issuance
observed over 2003–08.  Net corporate bond issuance by 
UK private non-financial corporations in 2009 was also
stronger than over the 2003–08 period.  It is not possible to
know what would have happened in the absence of QE, but the
Bank’s market contacts suggest that there was strong
institutional investor demand for corporate bonds during the
second half of 2009.
Inflation expectations
Inflation expectations might be expected to increase in
response to the monetary stimulus associated with QE.  
Chart 9 shows that short to medium-term RPI inflation
breakeven rates derived from gilts fell sharply in late 2008 
to unusually low, and even negative, levels before
subsequently rising (though long-term breakeven rates
remained more stable).  This pattern is consistent with a fall
and subsequent increase in market participants’ inflation
expectations, although it is hard to draw a direct signal from
these measures, as they will have been affected by market
functioning and will also incorporate premia for uncertainty
around inflation.
The various survey-based measures of longer-term household
and economist inflation expectations shown in Chart 10 also
suggest some evidence of falls during late 2008, which then
reversed gradually during 2009.  This suggests that QE may
have helped reduce the weight that agents placed on
outcomes of persistent low inflation, though a number of
other external factors (such as energy and other import prices)
are likely to have influenced inflation expectations over this
period.
Money and borrowing rates
From the onset of the financial crisis in 2007, broad money
growth slowed dramatically in the United Kingdom, falling
from around 10% a year to below 1% a year in early 2010.
Since then, money growth has picked up slightly but remains
below nominal GDP growth (Chart 11).  This pattern reflects,
in part, a sharp slowdown in lending to the non-bank private

















Chart 9 Inflation breakeven rates from gilts(a)
Sources:  Bloomberg and Bank calculations.
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Barclays Basix ﬁve years ahead(a)
Chart 10 Indicators of long-term inflation expectations
Sources:  Barclays Capital, Bloomberg, Citigroup, GfK NOP, HM Treasury, YouGov and 
Bank calculations.
(a) Bank/NOP, Barclays Basix and YouGov/Citigroup household measures do not reference a
specific price index and are based on the median estimated price change.
(1) To provide an idea of plausible magnitudes, a 100 basis points fall in risk-free rates
would, all else equal, be expected to increase equity prices by 15%, using a dividend
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Chart 11 Broad money and nominal GDP(a)(b)(c)
(a) Recession periods are shown in grey.  Recessions are defined as at least two consecutive
quarters of falling output (at constant market prices) estimated using the latest data.  The
recessions are assumed to end once output began to rise.
(b) Nominal GDP is measured at current market prices.
(c) Broad money is constructed as headline M4 growth prior to 1998 Q4 and M4 growth
excluding intermediate OFCs thereafter.  Intermediate OFCs are:  mortgage and housing
credit corporations;  non-bank credit guarantors;  bank holding companies;  and those
carrying out other activities auxiliary to financial intermediation.  Banks’ business with their
related ‘other financial intermediaries’ is also excluded, based on anecdotal information
provided to the Bank of England by several banks.208 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q3
level relative to nominal GDP.  But also net issuance of equity
and long-term debt by banks, as they have sought to
deleverage and rebuild their capital bases, and net repayments
of bank debt by non-banks have both detracted from broad
money growth (see Bridges, Rossiter and Thomas (2011) for
more details).
Offsetting those trends somewhat has been the increase in the
money supply generated by asset purchases by the Bank.  To
the extent that those purchases were made from non-banks or
that banks used the money to buy other assets from the 
non-bank sector, purchases by the Bank would initially have
increased the level of broad money relative to nominal GDP.  
Higher asset prices may then have encouraged firms to
increase the extent to which they use capital markets for
finance, rather than banks. This may have resulted in higher
growth of nominal spending relative to broad money than
would have been the case in the absence of central bank asset
purchases.  Chart 12 shows that there is evidence that UK
firms in aggregate did, to an extent, disintermediate the
banking sector during 2009 through higher issuance of capital
market equity and debt relative to bank borrowing.
To the extent that it facilitated a rebuilding of banks’ balance
sheets, QE purchases may, through lower borrowing costs,
have also helped to ensure that bank lending growth fell less
rapidly than would otherwise have been the case.  There is,
however, little evidence that effective new bank lending rates
for households or firms fell significantly following QE
purchases, even though there were substantial falls in the
spread between interbank lending rates and OIS rates over the
period (Chart 13).  But it is hard to estimate what the
counterfactual would have been.
Confidence
It is very hard to disentangle the effect of QE from that of
other factors affecting confidence.  There is circumstantial
evidence, however, that confidence improved during the
period in which asset purchases were taking place.  One source
of evidence can be found in the distributions around future
asset prices implied by options markets.  Chart 14 shows that
the option-implied distribution around the FTSE 100 equity
index twelve months ahead did not just shift horizontally in
line with the increase in the index in the period following QE
purchases but also narrowed markedly, with investors placing
much less weight on large downside risks.  This change in the
shape of the distribution is consistent with investors being
more confident about the outlook for future equity prices,
though it is also likely to reflect other international
developments in addition to QE in the United Kingdom.
Similarly, measures of confidence for households and firms
also improved markedly in 2009 following QE purchases.
Chart 15 shows that confidence for both consumers and firms
fell to between two and four standard deviations below recent
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Chart 12 Net external finance raised by UK private 
non-financial corporates
(a) Non seasonally adjusted.
(b) Monetary and financial institutions.  Three-month moving averages.  Includes sterling and
foreign currency funds.
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Chart 13 Sterling three-month Libor-OIS spreads
Sources:  Bloomberg and Bank calculations.
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Chart 14 Option-implied distribution of the FTSE 100
index twelve months ahead 
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almost entirely reversed during 2009, as QE purchases were
being made.  Again, it is hard to know how much of that
increase was due directly to QE purchases, given that there was
a global recovery in confidence during the period and action to
stimulate global demand from a range of countries.  But the
movements are consistent with QE having reduced the
perceptions of large downside risks and uncertainty in the
economy as a whole during 2009.
Wider macroeconomic effects
The wider macroeconomic effects of QE are difficult to
quantify.  A host of other factors have been important in
influencing the UK economy during the crisis period, making it
almost impossible to isolate the incremental effects of QE.
But despite these difficulties, a growing number of studies
have begun to evaluate the macroeconomic effects of
unconventional monetary policies in the United Kingdom 
and elsewhere using a variety of approaches.(1) What follows 
is an assessment of the macroeconomic effects of the 
United Kingdom’s asset purchases drawing on the latest 
Bank of England research.
Model-based estimates
SVAR approach: A common approach is to characterise QE
solely through its effects on longer-maturity government bond
yields.  The simplest starting point for this kind of analysis is to
use a small structural vector autoregression (SVAR) containing
the policy rate, a government bond yield (the ten-year spot
rate), real GDP growth and CPI inflation.  A ‘QE shock’ can be
identified by assuming that a negative shock to bond yields
leads to a contemporaneous rise in GDP and CPI inflation, but
has no effect on policy rates (which are constrained at the zero
bound).  Estimating this model using quarterly UK data over a
sample period predating the crisis (1992 Q1 to 2007 Q2), and
shocking the ten-year gilt yield by 100 basis points, results in a
peak impact on the level of real GDP of just under 1.5% and a
peak effect on annual CPI inflation of about 3/$ percentage
points.  These effects should be taken as illustrative, given the
simplicity of the model and the fact that it has been estimated
on a sample predating the crisis.  Furthermore, in looking at an
impulse response, the assumption is that QE is similar to a
typical one-period shock to bond yields.  This implies rather
less persistence than might be expected if QE has operated
primarily through a portfolio balance effect.  Despite these
caveats, the effects on key macro variables appear
economically significant.
Multiple time-series models approach: It is also possible to
use more sophisticated econometric models to look at this
issue.  Kapetanios et al (2011) use three different time-series
models of varying complexity to conduct counterfactual
forecasts of the effects of QE.  The approach (broadly similar in
spirit to Lenza, Pill and Reichlin (2010)) is to use these models
to conduct conditional forecasts under ‘policy’ and ‘no policy’
scenarios and then to attribute the difference in the resulting
forecasts to the effects of the policy.  In the no policy scenario,
it is assumed that without QE five and ten-year gilt yields
would have been 100 basis points higher, although a variety of
alternative scenarios are also examined.  Averaging across the
models suggests that QE had a peak effect on the level of GDP
of around 11/@% and a peak effect on annual CPI inflation of
about 11/$ percentage points.(2) These estimates vary
considerably across the individual model specifications, and
with the assumptions made to generate the counterfactual
forecasts, suggesting they are subject to considerable
uncertainty.
Monetary approach: An alternative method of estimating the
effects of QE is to focus on its impact on the money supply.
Bridges and Thomas (2011) first calculate the impact of QE on
the money supply, allowing for the various other influences on
broad money over the period.  They then apply their estimates
to two econometric models — an aggregate SVAR model and a
linked set of sectoral money demand systems — that allow
them to calculate how asset prices and spending need to
adjust to make money demand consistent with the increase in
broad money supply.  Their preferred model estimates suggest
that the higher money supply resulting from QE may have
boosted the level of GDP by around 2% and CPI inflation by
about 1%, though again these estimates are subject to a lot of
uncertainty.  
Bottom-up approach
Ideally one would want to make an assessment using a
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Chart 15 Survey-based measures of consumer and
business confidence 
Sources:  CIPS/Markit, research carried out by GfK NOP on behalf of the European Commission,
Nationwide, YouGov and Bank calculations.
(a) Consumer confidence. 
(b) Overall prosperity index derived from the answers to questions 1, 2d, 4 and 5 of the YouGov
survey.
(c) This aggregate confidence index is derived by averaging the answers to questions 2, 4, 7 (with
inverted sign) and 11 in the GfK NOP survey carried out on behalf of the European
Commission.  Data are seasonally adjusted.
(d) Business confidence.
(e) CIPS/Markit services business expectations.  Data are seasonally adjusted.
(1) Papers on the effects of other central bank’s unconventional policies include:  Lenza,
Pill and Reichlin (2010) on the European Central Bank’s policy actions and Chung et al
(2011) on the Federal Reserve’s policy actions.
(2) These numbers refer to the lower of the two ‘no policy’ variants given in the paper.210 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q3
embodying all the relevant transmission channels discussed
earlier appears to exist.  The forecasting model used by the
Bank of England, in common with most large-scale
macroeconomic models, does not explain risk premia and
therefore does not embody a portfolio balance channel.  But,
to make a rough calculation, one can take a more bottom-up
approach.  More specifically, the effects of the QE policy can
be broken down into two main elements:  (1) the impact of
asset purchases on gilt prices and other asset prices and (2) the
effect of asset prices on demand and hence inflation. 
A number of ways of estimating (1) were already discussed
above.  The analysis of the QE announcement effects
suggested that asset purchases pushed down medium to 
long-term gilt yields by about 100 basis points.  The effect 
of QE on a broader range of asset prices is much more
uncertain, but there was an immediate 70 basis points fall in
investment-grade corporate bond yields and a 150 basis points
fall in sub-investment grade yields.  There is considerable
uncertainty about the effect on equity prices and the
immediate market reaction is unlikely to provide an accurate
guide, but an estimated portfolio balance model would
suggest an impact of around 20%.(1) Combining these effects
on government and corporate bonds and equity prices
suggests an overall boost to households’ net financial wealth
of about 16%.  
To quantify the next leg in the transmission mechanism,
between asset prices and demand, a range of simple models
may be used.  To calculate the impact on consumer spending,
it is necessary to calculate the wealth elasticity of
consumption.  One way of doing this is to make an annuity
calculation, assuming that households perceive the policy’s
effects as long-lasting and want to spend their extra wealth
evenly over their lifetimes.  To calculate the effects on business
and dwellings investment, one can use Q models, where the
incentive to invest depends on the market value of capital
relative to its replacement cost.  Higher asset prices should
raise the market value of capital and reduce the cost of
finance, boosting investment spending.  Allowing for
reasonable uncertainty about the initial impact on asset prices,
the result of these sorts of calculations would suggest a peak
impact on the level of real GDP of between 11/@% and 21/@%. 
The timing of the output effects from a change in asset prices
might be expected to be slower than from a normal interest
rate cut, which has a peak effect on output after a year.  This
reflects the fact that, unlike a conventional interest rate shock,
QE is not associated with an immediate change in household
and corporate interest rate payments.  Of course, there are
major uncertainties here and this sort of calculation ignores
some of the transmission channels discussed earlier.  It makes
no allowance for any effect through confidence or any effect
through the exchange rate.  So it might well understate the
effects. 
To quantify the impact on inflation a Phillips curve relationship
can be used.  A typical rule of thumb from a Phillips curve
relationship might be expected to imply that a 1% increase in
GDP would lead to a subsequent rise in inflation of 1/@ to 
1 percentage point after a year.  Obviously this is highly
uncertain and might provide a poor guide if QE were to lead to
higher inflation expectations or have large effects on the
exchange rate.  Nevertheless, applying this mapping to the
estimated impact of asset purchases on GDP would suggest
there could have been a subsequent impact on inflation of
between 3/$ to 21/@ percentage points.  
Summary of the macro effects
If we compute the range across the different estimation
methods, using the middle of the ranges of the bottom-up
estimates, this would suggest that QE may have raised the
level of real GDP by 11/@% to 2% and increased inflation by
between 3/$ to 11/@ percentage points (as shown in the bottom
row of Table C).(2) These estimates are clearly highly
uncertain, particularly as none of the methods used to produce
them fully capture all the likely transmission channels set out
earlier, but they do suggest that the effects of QE were
economically significant.
As another metric on how large these effects are, they can be
compared with the cut in Bank Rate that would be required to
produce a similar rise in CPI inflation.  The Bank’s forecasting
model suggests that a 100 basis point cut in Bank Rate
increases CPI inflation by about 1/@ percentage point after 18 to
24 months.  Applying the Bank model ready-reckoner to the
estimated 3/$ to 11/@ percentage point impact on inflation
would therefore suggest that the effect of QE was equivalent
to a 150 to 300 basis point cut in Bank Rate, a significant
reduction.  Of course, there are large uncertainties even with
this range, and the true number could plausibly be either
(1) This figure is also consistent with an approach based on modelling money demand 
(eg Bridges and Thomas (2011)).  
(2) For comparison, Chung et al (2011) estimate that phase one of the large-scale asset
purchase programme in the United States boosted the level of real GDP by almost
2%, while inflation is a percentage point higher than it would have been if the Federal
Open Market Committee had never initiated the programme.  According to their
estimates, the full programme of asset purchases will raise GDP by almost 3%.  
Table C Estimates of the macroeconomic impact of QE, peak
impact on the level of output and inflation 
Method Level of GDP  CPI inflation 
(per cent) (percentage points)
SVAR 11/@ 3/$
Multiple time-series models  11/@ 11/$
average impact(a)
Monetary approach(b) 21
Bottom-up approach 11/@–21/@ 3/$–21/@
Range across methods(c) 11/@–2 3/$–11/@
(a) Kapetanios et al (2011) (these estimates are based on the lower variant reported by the authors).
(b) Bridges and Thomas (2011).
(c) Calculated using the mid-point of the reported range for the bottom-up approach.Research and analysis The United Kingdom’s quantitative easing policy 211
smaller or larger, but it provides a rough order of magnitude of
the monetary stimulus implied by the QE policy.
Conclusion
This article provides an overview of the design, operation 
and impact of the Bank’s asset purchase programme that
began in 2009 in response to the intensification of the
financial crisis. 
The scale and speed of the programme was intended to reverse
declining confidence and the increasing risk of inflation falling
significantly below target in the medium term.  In large part,
the design of the scheme was intended to target purchases of
medium to long-dated gilts from the non-bank financial sector.
The most clear-cut evidence on the impact is from asset prices.
Gilt yields were depressed by around 100 basis points.  Effects
on a broader range of asset prices can be discerned but with
greater difficulty, reflecting the lags involved and the wider
range of influences.  These changes in asset prices were
expected to have conventional effects on output and then
inflation.  The article reviews a range of approaches taken in
recent Bank of England research to quantify the possible
impact of those asset price changes on output and inflation.
This evidence suggests that the policy had economically
significant effects — equivalent to a 150 to 300 basis point cut
in Bank Rate — but there is considerable uncertainty around
the precise magnitude of the impact.
The MPC may decide in the future to increase asset purchases
or to begin the process of selling assets back.  The economic
and financial circumstances in which further asset purchases or
sales are made may be very different from those that prevailed
in early 2009, so it cannot be assumed that the magnitude of
the effects will necessarily be the same.212 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q3
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